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I. Introduction
The District of Columbia (D.C.) marked a landmark civil rights
achievement in December 2009 when the city passed the Religious
Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act.1 The law’s
enactment allowed D.C. to become the sixth jurisdiction to sanction
same-sex marriage in the United States.2 Supporters hailed the law as a
* J.D. Candidate, American University Washington College of Law, 2011; B.A., The College of
William & Mary, 2007. Current Editor-In-Chief of The Modern American. Former community
organizer with Virginia Organizing and Board of Director at Equality Virginia. I would like to
thank Jamie Abrams for her feedback and support on this article.
1
A18-0248, enacted as L18-0110, Dec. 18, 2009. See D.C. City Council, “Religious Freedom and
Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act of 2009,” http://www.dccouncil.washington.dc.us/
lims/legislation.aspx?LegNo=B18-0482&Description=RELIGIOUS-FREEDOM-AND-CIVILMARRIAGE-EQUALITY-AMENDMENT-ACT-OF-2009.&ID=23204.
2
Ian Urbina, D.C. Council Approves Gay Marriage, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 2009 available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/12/16/us/16marriage .html.
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victory for lesbian and gay equality, while detractors vowed that their
efforts to traditionally define marriage would continue.3
Among the most public opponents of the law was the Catholic
Archdiocese of Washington, which operates Catholic Charities, a leading service provider to low-income residents in the metropolitan area.4
The Catholic Archdiocese warned the D.C. City Council that it would
sever its professional relationship with the city if the same-sex marriage law passed because same-sex unions are inconsistent with the
Church’s core theological teachings.5 Once the law went into effect,
over a year later, the D.C. City Council cancelled the foster and adoption program that the city’s Child and Family Services Agency and
the Catholic Archdiocese co-administered for eighty years, citing that
the religious organization was no longer eligible to provide services.6
Weeks later, the Catholic Archdiocese announced that it would no longer offer spousal benefits to its new employees.7 The political battle
between the D.C. City Council and the Catholic Archdiocese remains
heated, as the law’s full fall-out is yet to be realized. However, there are
two observations from this conflict that should inform lawmakers and
policy advocates alike.
The first observation is that Catholic Charities’s choice to cut its
employee benefits demonstrates the lengths to which some religious
organizations will go to deny lesbian and gay equality.8 D.C.’s samesex marriage law itself did not require that Catholic Charities discontinue its employee spousal benefits. Rather, the Catholic Archdiocese
chose to eliminate spousal benefits for all of its employees to comply

Id.
See Catholic Charities, “History and Mission,” available at http://www.catholiccharitiesdc.org/
about/history_mission/ (stating that Catholic Charities is the largest private service provider in
the D.C. area).
5
William Wan, Same-sex marriage leads Catholic Charities to adjust benefits, Wash. Post, Mar. 2,
2010 available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/01/
AR2010030103345.html (discussing Catholic Charities’ decision to termination spousal benefits
for new employees).
6
See Catholic News Agency, Same-sex ‘marriage’ law forces D.C. Catholic Charities to close adoption program, Catholic News Agency, Feb. 17, 2010 available at http://www.catholicnewsagency.
com/news/same-sex_marriagelaw_forces_d.c._catholic_charities_to_close_adoption_program
(discussing Catholic Charities’ decision to shut down its foster care program). A similar kind of
conflict led to Catholic Charities of Boston to close its adoption program. See generally, Theresa
Rutledge, Caught in the Crossfire: How Catholic Charities of Boston Was Victim to the Clash Between
Gay Rights and Religious Freedom, 15 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 297 (2008) (explaining the conflict
between religious liberty and gay rights as shown through the Catholic Charities of Boston adoption program closure after the state of Massachusetts passed its gay marriage law based on the
organization’s opposition to same-sex adoption).
7
Id.
8
This statement does not suggest that every Catholic Archdiocese would take similar action, but
it is meant to illustrate an extreme example.
3
4

Legislation & Policy Brief

57

with the Equal Pay Act9 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,10
which both were triggered by the same-sex marriage law. The Equal
Pay Act requires equal compensation for substantially similar work,11
and Title VII bans employer discrimination on the basis of sex,12 both of
which mandate equal compensation for employees performing similar
work, including fringe benefits.13 Catholic Charities, therefore, would
have been exposed to legal liability if the organization did not extend
equal employee benefits to those with same-sex spouses. The Catholic
Archdiocese ultimately elected to cut spousal benefits for every new
employee rather than to offer the same benefits to their new lesbian or
gay employees. In other words, Catholic Charities’ administrative decision hurt all of its new workers — gay and straight alike.
The second observation is that the D.C. City Council elected to
carve out a narrow religious activity exemption in its same-sex marriage law, which states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a religious society, or nonprofit organization that is operated,
supervised, or controlled by or in conjunction with a
religious society, shall not be required to provide services, accommodations, facilities, or goods for a purpose
related to the solemnization or celebration of a marriage, or
the promotion of a marriage through religious programs,
counseling, courses, or retreats, that is in violation of the
religious society’s beliefs (emphasis added).14
The Act’s religious organization exemption, related only to marriage activities, strikes a reasonable balance between religious freedom
and civil rights. On one hand, the exemption states that a religious
organization may refuse to sanction same-sex unions, but, on the other
hand, the exemption also implicitly recognizes that civil society may
9
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1963) available at http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/ statutes/epa.cfm (“The
Equal Pay Act is more limited in scope because it only covers employers ‘engaged in commerce
or the production of goods for commerce’; therefore, it is possible, though unlikely, that the Equal
Pay Act would apply to Catholic Charities. . . .”).
10
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., as amended, available at http://www.eeoc.gov /laws/statutes/titlevii.
cfm (establishing equal employment opportunities).
11
See supra note 9.
12
See supra note 10.
13
See U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, Compensation Discrimination Compliance
Manual under “Definitions of ‘Wages’ and ‘Wage Rate,’ available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/compensation .html#N_40 (“The term ‘wages’ encompasses all forms of compensation,
including fringe benefits.”).
14
D.C. Code 46-401(e)(1) (2009) available at http://www.dcregs.dc.gov/ Gateway/NoticeHome.
aspx?noticeid=114380 (clarifying that “Marriage between 2 people in the District of Columbia
shall not be denied or limited on the basis of gender.”). See also D.C. Code 46-401(d) (“Each religious society has exclusive control over its own theological doctrine, teachings, and beliefs regarding who may marry within that particular religious society’s faith.”).
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exercise its institutional prerogative to confer benefits to whomever it
chooses. Religious freedom and civil rights, in this way, can harmonize
to accommodate a plurality of beliefs and interests.
The D.C. law is an exception, however, as many lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender civil rights laws fail to strike a reasonable balance between religious freedom and robust discrimination protection.15
Most notably, the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA),16
designed to extend federal employment discrimination protection to
gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people,17 contained a
religious organization exemption much broader than the existing Title
VII exemption. ENDA’s religious exemption, taking different iterations
over fifteen years, begs an important question: why were religious
organizations permitted to discriminate against LGBT people but not
against other statutorily protected groups?18
This comment discusses ENDA’s long history of broad religious
exemption and its meanings for LGBT civil rights progress ahead. Part
I traces ENDA’s religious exemption transformation from 1994 to present, noting a narrowing of the exemption as the LGBT movement witnessed increasing political success. Part II examines the delicate balance
between the First Amendment Religion Clauses, as well as LGBT civil
rights and religious freedom, and argues that ENDA’s previous exemptions tipped this delicate balance toward religious over-accommodation prohibited by the Establishment Clause. Part III concludes that the
LGBT movement experienced a significant victory with the modified
religious exemption in the 2009 version of ENDA, which challenged
the conservative Christian bloc’s political and cultural monopoly over
LGBT rights’ narrative, and represents the defeat of a potentially dangerous precedent for future civil rights struggles.

Many state and local LGBT civil rights statutes wholly exempt religious organizations. See e.g.,
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-81p (West 2009); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 151B, § 4 (West 2009).
16
ENDA was originally introduced in 1994. See S. 2238, 103d Cong. (1994) available at http://
frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 103_cong_bills&docid=f:s2238is.txt.pdf.
Iterations of the bill have been introduced in almost every subsequent year to date.
17
It was not until the most recent ENDA version, the 2009 bill, that the law included “gender
identity” and “gender expression” which protects transgender and gender non-conforming people. See Nat’l Center for Lesbian Rights, Employment Non-Discrimination Act, available at http://
www.nclrights.org/site/PageServer?pagename=issue_federallegislation_enda (describing the
provisions and background of ENDA).
18
There is one statutorily protected status that is not protected against religious organization
discrimination: religion. This exception will be discussed in further detail later in Part I.
15
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II. The Evolution of ENDA’s Religious
Organization Exemption
ENDA has been introduced in almost every Congress from 1994 to
2009.19 Its amendment to its religious exemption in 2009 is consistent
with the bill’s numerous religious exemption iterations since 1994.20
ENDA’s religious exemption began as an extremely broad measure, but
it has steadily narrowed since.21 These changes reflect the bill’s political
viability for passage from session-to-session, in which the bill’s sponsors conceded broader exemptions as a bargaining tool, despite its
ill-fated chances for passage.22 As ENDA’s likelihood for passage was
greater during the 111th Congress than any other time, the religious
organization exemption is both a crucial provision, and indicator about
the political climate on gay rights, more generally.
A. ENDA’s Evolution from 1994 to 2007
The 1994 version of ENDA contained a very broad religious
exemption, providing that the Act “shall not apply to religious
organizations.”23 It did, however, provide a for-profit exception whose
application reached “for-profit activities subject to taxation under section 511(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.”24 This exception
was comparatively insignificant because many religiously-affiliated,
secular organizations are not-for-profit organizations.25 ENDA’s initial
See S. 2238, 103d Cong. §7(a) (1994) available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=103_cong_ bills&docid=f:s2238is.txt.pdf; H.R. 1863, 104th Cong. §6 (1995)
available at thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c104:1:./temp/~mdbszcMrs3; S.869, 105th Cong.
§ 9 (1997) available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=105_cong_
bills&docid=f:s869is.txt.pdf; S. 1276, 106th Cong. §9 (1999) available at http://frwebgate.access.
gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_cong_bills&docid=f:s1276is.txt.pdf ; S. 1284, 107th
Cong. §9 (2001) available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_
cong_bills&docid=f:s1284is.txt.pdf; S.1705, 108th Cong. §9 (2003) available at http://frwebgate.
access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_cong_bills&docid=f:s1705is.txt.pdf;
H.R.
3685, 110th Cong. § 6 (2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.
cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:h3685pcs.txt.pdf.
20
See id.
21
Compare, e.g., S. 2238, 103d Cong. §7(a) (1994) available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/
cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=103_cong_ bills&docid=f:s2238is.txt.pdf with H.R. 3685, 110th Cong.
§ 6 (2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_
bills&docid=f:h3685pcs.txt.pdf.
22
See Matt Baume, Pressure mounts to pass ENDA, Bay Area Reporter, May 20, 2010 available at
http://www.ebar.com/news/article.php? sec=news&article=4795 (“It’s been 16 years since the
Employment Non-Discrimination Act was first introduced in Congress, and according to organizers of a Tuesday rally at Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s San Francisco office, it’s closer than ever to being
finally passed.”).
23
S. 2238, 103d Cong. §7(a) (1994) available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.
cgi?dbname=103_cong_ bills&docid=f:s2238is.txt.pdf.
24
Id. at §7(b).
25
See Andrew C. Nichols, Exemptions for “Religious Corporations” from Employment Discrimination
Statutes: Should Non-Profit Status Be Required?, 3 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 133, 137 (2005) (noting
19
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broad exemption is not surprising considering that lawmakers were
unlikely to jeopardize the legislation amidst a Republican-controlled
Congress at the height of the “Republican Revolution.”26
During the bill’s subsequent re-introduction from 19942001, the
legislation’s exemption did not change at all until 2001. The 1995
and 1996 Senate bills retained the 1994 language.27 The legislation’s
first House hearings in the Government Programs Subcommittee of
the Committee on Small Business took place in 1996.28 Georgetown
University Law Center Associate Professor Chai R. Feldblum, testifying in support of the bill, acknowledged that the bill contained a “broad
religious exemption.” She explained the exemption scope was “significantly broader than the scope in Title VII” because “ENDA exempts
religious organizations completely” except for profit-making activities,
which was a sharp contrast to similar exemptions, including Title VII,
which remained “subject to the other requirements of Title VII with
regard to such bases as race or gender (consistent with constitutional
limitations).”29 In 1997, lawmakers tweaked part B of the exemption
related to the not-for-profit exception; however, the exception remained
ostensibly the same.30
Years of ENDA rejection finally led to a small victory when President
Bill Clinton issued Executive Order 13087, which extended employment
protections to federal employees.31 The revised order added “sexual orientation” to Executive Order 11478, “Equal Employment Opportunity
in the Federal Government,” which protected federal employees from

that no court has held that Title VII’s religious exemption codified in 702 applies to a for-profit
corporation).
26
See, e.g., Robert Woodberry & Christian Smith, Fundamentalism et al: Conservative Protestants
in America, 24 Annual Review of Sociology, 25, 44 (1998) (describing the conservative, evangelical, Moral Majority movement’s evolution into the Republican Revolution of the 1990s which
maintained opposition to social valued-based issues, such as the gay rights movement); see also
Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, Off Center: the Republican revolution and the erosion
of American Democracy (2005) (contextualizing the conservative Republican Revolution mid90s success as led by Newt Gingrich).
27
See S.932, 104th Cong. § 8 (1995) available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c104:S.932
(re-introduced in 1996 as S.2056).
28
Human Rights Campaign, Timeline: The Employment Non-Discrimination Act, http://www.
hrc.org/issues/5636.htm (tracking the legislative history of ENDA).
29
H.R. 1863: The Employment Non-Discrimination Act Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Gov’t Programs
of the H. Comm. on Small Businesses, 104th Cong. 143 (1996) (statement of Chai Feldblum) available at
http://ia311312.us.archive.org/2/items/hr1863employment00unit/hr1863employment00unit.
pdf. (explaining differences in the legislation).
30
See S.869, 105th Cong. § 9 (1997) available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.
cgi?dbname=105_cong _bills&docid=f:s869is.txt.pdf (providing religious organization exception).
31
See Exec. Order No. 1308, 3 C.F.R. 191 (1998) available at http://www.opm.gov/er/EO13087.
HTM (amending Executive Order 11478 “by substituting ‘age, or sexual orientation’ for ‘or age’”).
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discrimination on the bases of race, color, sex, religion, and national origin.32 Later in the year, the House of Representatives handily rejected
the Hefley Amendment, which was designed to prohibit federal funds
in the executive order’s enforcement.33 The following year ENDA was
re-introduced with the same 1997 exemption language, 34 but it again
failed to pass Congress, making President Clinton’s executive order the
height of the bill’s success approaching the new century.
ENDA’s religious organization exemption ballooned in 2001
when the for-profit exception was stripped from the provision.35 The
revised provision simply read, “[t]his Act shall not apply to a religious organization.”36 It is unclear from the legislative history why the
broad exception was further expanded in 2001. In 2002, however, several bill witnesses supported the legislation during the Senate Health,
Education, Labor and Pensions Committee hearing, including primary
bill sponsor, Patty Murray (D-Washington).37 The religious exemption,
like in years’ past,38 became an even more attractive proverbial carrot
for LGBT advocates, instead of being seen as a stumbling block to the
legislation’s efficacy. In other words, the broadness of the religious
exemption remained a political selling point in 2003,39 even when such
language, as the proverbial “stick,” had the potential to hurt gay workers at religious organizations.
This history reveals an interestingly nuanced evolution since 1994.
The original ENDA bill contained a broad exception that only contained a small for-profit exception; however, seven years later in 2001,
the religious exemption expanded to even broader to become a blanket
exception for religious organizations. The politics of compromise trace
closely to the bill’s political palpability. ENDA transformed to become
increasingly viable to lawmakers facing tremendous pressure from
Exec. Order No. 11478, 3 C.F.R. 803 (1966-1970) available at http://www.archives.gov/federalregister/codification/executive-order/11478.html (providing for equal employment opportunity
in the Federal Government).
33
See Human Rights Campaign, supra note 28.
34
See S. 1276, 106th Cong. §9 (1999) available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.
cgi?dbname=106_cong_ bills&docid=f:s1276is.txt.pdf (prohibiting employment discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation).
35
S. 1284, 107th Cong. § 9 (2001) available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.
cgi?dbname=107_cong_ bills&docid=f:s1284is.txt.pdf (exempting religious organizations).
36
Id.
37
The Employment Non-Discrimination Act Hearing Before the Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions, 107th Cong. 5 (2002) (statement of Sen. Patty Murray), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_senate_hearings&docid=f:78032.pdf. See also id. at
18 (statement by Senator Hillary Clinton); id. at 39 (statement by Senator Edward Kennedy); id. at
34 (statement by Richard Womack, Dir. AFL-CIO Civil Rights Dep’t).
38
See, e.g, H.R. 1863: The Employment Non-Discrimination Act Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Gov’t Programs of the H. Comm. on Small Businesses, supra note 29, at 2 (“ENDA is not a law that
would require religious organizations to follow it, as religious organization would be exempt, as
would very small businesses, those with 15 or fewer employees.”).
39
See S.1705, 108th Cong. §9 (2003) available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.
cgi?dbname=108_cong_ bills&docid=f:s1705is.txt.pdf.
32
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powerful conservative constituencies as the LGBT movement made
tangible gains in the marriage equality battle, and gained more favorable visibility among Americans, in general.40 Upon approaching the
legislative climax in 2007, a year in which it appeared as if the ENDA
could make real progress, lawmakers and leading advocates accepted
concessions that would deeply divide the LGBT communities.41 During
the “year of compromise,” the religious exemption was modified once
again, yet gained very little attention.
B. The Year of Compromises
Representative Barney Frank (D-Mass.) re-introduced ENDA in
2007 with an infamous omission — the bill did not include “gender
identity” in its protections. Since 2003, the activist political landscape
had changed, and many LGBT advocates expected “gender identity” to
be included in the new version of the bill.42 As a protected status, “gender identity”43 primarily protects transgender44 people from discrimination. It also provides broader protection for lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and some heterosexual people who do not conform to conventional
gender norms.45 Widely seen as a full set of protections, “sexual orienta-

See Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans’ Opposition to Gay Marriage Eases Slightly, Gallup Organization
(May 24, 2010) http://www.gallup.com/ poll/128291/americans-opposition-gay-marriage-eases-slightly.aspx (documenting a positive trend toward same-sex marriage since 2004).
41
See infra note 49.
42
See, e.g., Julie R. Enzer, Legislative Bargain Frays Some in LGBT Community, Women’s eNews
(Nov. 16, 2007) available at womensenews.org/ story/lesbian-and-transgender/071116/legislative-bargain-frays-some-in-lgbt community (“gender identity” was in the original version of the
bill submitted to the House, only to be stripped during committee to ensure House passage) (“The
original bill was expected to pass out of the House and the Senate relatively easily . . . But in late
September, Frank, who is openly gay and the bill’s lead sponsor, told advocates that ENDA — the
Employment Non-Discrimination Act — did not have the votes to pass the House if it included
gender identity”).
43
See Understanding Transgender: Frequently Asked Questions about Transgender
People, National Center for Transgender Rights 6 (May 2009), available at http://www.transequality.org/Resources/ NCTE_UnderstandingTrans.pdf (“Gender identity refers to the way
you understand yourself and your gender. It is about the internal sense of masculinity or femininity that a person feels.”).
44
Id. at 1–2.
45
Cf. Lambda Legal’s Analysis of Stripped Down Version of ENDA: Gender Identity Protections Gone and
Inadequate Protections for Lesbians, Gay Men and Bisexuals, Lambda Legal (Oct. 1, 2007), available
at http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/pr/lambda-legals-analysis-enda.html (discussing how
the absence of language protecting lesbians, gays, and bisexuals that do not conform to the employer’s idea of how a man or woman should look and act is a loophole that allows employers to
escape liability for discrimination by claiming their conduct was based on gender expression).
40
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tion, gender identity and expression” became the policy archetype for
non-discrimination laws for which activists across the country fought.46
Transgender-inclusive non-discrimination laws passed in several
jurisdictions during the intervening time between ENDA’s 2003 and
2007 introductions.47 Therefore, the absence of “gender identity,” and
its justification from Barney Frank and other prominent LGBT advocacy groups, most notably the Human Rights Campaign, ignited
a firestorm of controversy.48 The bill ultimately passed the House of
Representatives but it died at Senate chambers.49 Some moderate lawmakers were reluctant to support a version of the bill that included
“gender identity,”50 but the political compromise was not an acceptable conciliation to many in the LGBT community, as evidenced by the
sharp division arising from the national debate.
Lawmakers’ failure to update ENDA to include “gender identity”
protections earned the bill a great deal of attention, but the 2007 version
contained a critical change that was overshadowed by the controversy
— a slightly narrower religious exemption provision. The 2007 exemption was narrower than recent years’ provisions that granted wholesale
See Scope of Explicitly Transgender-Inclusive Anti-Discrimination Laws, Transgender Law & Pol’y
Inst & Nat’l Gay & Lesbian Task Force (Apr. 2006) (showing that eight states and eighty-one
localities ban discrimination on the basis of gender identity and expression). Many of these jurisdictions recently passed these laws within the last ten years.
47
See id; see also Kate Linthicum, Transgender Rights Advocates See a Gradual Series of Victories, L.A.
Times, May 26, 2010, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2010/may/26/nation/la-na-transgender-20100526 (mentioning that many state and local ordinances have banned discrimination
based on gender identity); Non-Discrimination Laws That Include Gender Identity and Expression,
Transgender Law & Pol’y Inst & Nat’l Gay & Lesbian Task Force (Feb. 17, 2001), available at
http://www.transgenderlaw.org/ndlaws/index.htm (detailing the state jurisdictions that have
laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender expression and prohibiting discrimination in public employment on the basis of gender identification); Years Passed Between Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity Expression, Transgender Civ. Rts. Project (July 2007), available
at
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/fact_sheets/years_passed_gie_so_7_07.
pdf (displaying the county, city, or states that added sexual orientation to its anti-discrimination
laws, with 50 counties, cities, or states adding the provision since 2003). Transgender advocates
stressed the importance to include gender protections in the 2007 version of ENDA due to the
significant lag between the passage of lesbian and gay anti-discrimination laws and transgender
anti-discrimination laws.
48
See, e.g., Kilian Melloy, Dropping the ‘T: New Version of ENDA Does Not Protect Trans People, EDGE
Bos. (Oct. 1, 2007), available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/TF_in_news/07_1009/stories/14_
dropping_the_t.pdf (“LGBT leaders are furious over Frank’s maneuver, reported 365Gay.com,
adding that Rep. Tammy Baldwin — other than Frank, Congress’ only openly gay member — had
withdrawn her sponsorship of ENDA with the announcement of the new version.”).
49
See David Crary, New Impetus For Bill Banning Anti-Gay Bias for bill banning anti-gay
bias at work, Guardian (Aug. 28, 2009), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/
feedarticle/8678991?FORM=ZZNR10 (“Frank pushed ENDA in 2007, but it foundered because of
insufficient backing in the Senate and a split within the gay and transgender communities.”).
50
See Julie Bolcer, Centrist Democrats Balking at ENDA Vote, Advocate, May 10, 2010, available
at http://www.advocate.com/News/Daily_News /2010/05/10/Centrists_Democrats_Balking_
at_ENDA_Vote_/ (explaining the concerns moderates had over the transgender inclusive legislation affecting their chances at reelection).
46
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exemptions; however, it still remained much broader than Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, under which the 2009 bill’s exemption is
modeled.51 Title VII’s religious organization exemption provides in relevant part:
This subchapter shall not apply to an employer with
respect . . . to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform
work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its
activities.52
Title VII’s religious organization exemption, also known as the
ministerial exception,53 is narrowly applicable to discrimination on the
basis of religion by a religious organization. In some circumstances,
religious organizations’ secular activities may fall under this exemption
as well. In 1978, the United States Supreme Court held in Corporation
of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos.54
that the exemption’s application to secular organizations run by religious entities does not violate the First Amendment’s Establishment
Clause,55 which bars religious endorsement by Congress. The Court
applied the three-part test set out in Lemon v. Kurtzman56 to determine
whether the exemption’s application to secular activity amounted to
religious “sponsorship.”57 It concluded that the exemption did not rise
to the level of an Establishment Clause violation, and re-affirmed that
a law may exhibit “‘benevolent neutrality which will permit religious
exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.’”58
51
Compare infra note 57 with H.R. 2981, 111th Cong. (2009) available at thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/
query/F?c111:1:./temp/~c111JnzOcb:e11096:.
52
42 U.S.C. §2000e-1(a).
53
See, e.g., Note The Ministerial Exception to Title VII: The Case for a Deferential Primary Duties Test,
121 Harv. L. Rev. 1776, 1776 (2007 — 2008) (describing the ministerial exception as “allow[ing]
religious employers to avoid liability for discrimination when making employment decisions concerning employees who qualify as ministers.” Cf. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources
of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (qualifying the ministerial exception that was expanded by Amos to include religious function employees). But see Jack M. Battaglia, Religion, Sexual
Orientation, and Self-Realization: First Amendment Principles and Anti-Discrimination Laws, 76 U. Det.
Mercy L. Rev. 189, 271–73 (1999) (noting that an eminent legal scholar believes that the Smith
holding will not affect the broader ministerial rule announced in Amos that permits religious
organizations to engage in religious and certain non-religious discrimination, against religious
function employees).
54
483 U.S. 327 (1987) [hereinafter “Amos”].
55
Id. at 330.
56
Lemon v. Kurzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (“First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion
. . . finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”).
57
See Amos, 483 U.S. at 337.
58
Id. at 334 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)).
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Despite the Court’s sweeping language, its ruling kept the ministerial exemption limited to religious discrimination by secular, but religiously-affiliated organizations. Altogether, Title VII’s exemption is not
tantamount to wholesale religious organization exemption.
The ENDA of 2007 is not as limited in its religious exceptions as
Title VII. Under 2007’s Section 6 of ENDA:
(a) In General- This Act shall not apply to any of the
employment practices of a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society which has as
its primary purpose religious ritual or worship or the
teaching or spreading of religious doctrine or belief.
(b) Certain Employees- For any religious corporation,
association, educational institution, or society that is
not wholly exempt under subsection (a), this Act shall
not apply with respect to the employment of individuals whose primary duties consist of teaching or spreading religious doctrine or belief, religious governance,
supervision of a religious order, supervision of persons teaching or spreading religious doctrine or belief,
or supervision or participation in religious ritual or
worship.
(c) Conformity to Religious Tenets- Under this Act, a
religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society may require that applicants for, and
employees in, similar positions conform to those religious tenets that such corporation, association, institution, or society declares significant. Under this Act,
such a declaration by a religious corporation, association, educational institution or society stating which of
its religious tenets are significant shall not be subject to
judicial or administrative review. Any such declaration
made for purposes of this Act shall be admissible only
for proceedings under this Act.59
This exemption is much broader than Title VII’s exemption for two
reasons. First, the exemption’s language does not contain a narrowing principle that restricts religious organizations to discriminate on
religious grounds only, as seen in the Title VII’s language, “individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying
on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society
of its activities” (emphasis added).60 Instead, ENDA’s exemption is
H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. § 6 (2007) available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.
cgi?dbname=110_cong_ bills&docid=f:h3685pcs.txt.pdf.
60
See Melloy, supra note 48.
59
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applicable to “individuals whose primary duties consist of teaching or
spreading religious doctrine or belief, religious governance, supervision of a religious order, supervision of persons teaching or spreading
religious doctrine or belief, or supervision or participation in religious
ritual or worship.”61 The narrowing principle — that religious organizations can only discriminate on religious grounds — is absent in
ENDA’s exemption, which permits religious organizations to discriminate against individuals whose primary duties consist of a range of
activities within the organization. Although, at first glance it appears
that the 2007 ENDA language may simply be more specific than Title
VII, the absence of the principle is paramount as the principal language
is missing an analytical analogue pertaining to LGBT people and religious activities. In other words, a loophole can be read into the legislative language, in which the exemption excuses religious organizations
if organizations’ teachings reject homosexuality (broadly conceived to
include transgender people). A religious organization may easily argue
that an openly gay person, a person engaging in sex with same-sex
partner(s), or a gender non-conforming person violates the organization’s tenants, and therefore, cannot perform their work-related duties
as a person expressly violating core teachings, even if that person’s
work performance is in no way implicated. Therefore, the absence of a
meaningful narrowing principle for LGBT people within the 2007 version of ENDA effectively broadens the religious exemption.62
Moreover, Section 6(c) of ENDA contained explicit language that
precluded judicial review of the invocation of the religious exemption.
The section provided that, “[u]nder this Act, such a declaration by a
religious corporation, association, educational institution or society
stating which of its religious tenets are significant shall not be subject
to judicial or administrative review.”63 Although there are legitimate
reasons to dissuade courts from scrutinizing professed beliefs,64 it has
483 U.S. 327, 330 (1987).
There was explicit language in the legislation itself that displayed the bill’s authors’ intent to
broaden the exemption in this regard. See H.R. 2015, Section 6(c), available at thomas.loc.gov/
cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp /~c11014HekY:e11850: (“Under this Act, a religious corporation,
association, educational institution, or society may require that applicants for, and employees in,
similar positions conform to those religious tenants that such corporation, association, institution,
or society declares significant.”). It is my personal speculation that such plainly biased language
would have been stripped in the Senate, which would not have come at such a huge cost to the
language’s proponents, because of the other exemption language is the bill could have been construed to have a similar effect.
63
Id.
64
The governing standard among U.S. courts is to avoid scrutinizing religious beliefs. See Richard
Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach to Religious Doctrine: What Are We Talking About?, 84 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 837, 837 (2009) (“[T]he program organized by the Section on Law and Religion presented for
consideration the claim that ‘the United States Supreme Court has shown an increasing unwillingness to engage in deciding matters that relate to the interpretation of religious practice and belief.’  
The Court, it was proposed, is — more and more — taking a ‘hands-off approach to religious
doctrine . . .’”)(citations omitted). See Watts v. Florida Intern. University, 495 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11th
61
62

Legislation & Policy Brief

67

been a historically prudential issue for the courts. The concern is that
if codified into law, then many religious organizations could have
been shielded from judicial review. Such construction was probably a
means, as a practical matter, to guard religious organizations from legal
liability.65
Some commentators interpreted the religious exemption to still
maintain some coverage, however small, despite its far-reaching language.66 These commentators argued that the provision contained narrowing principles like those that within Title VII because the exemption
did not apply to religious organizations that did not have “religious
ritual or worship or the teaching or spreading of religious doctrine or
belief” as its primary purpose.67 The exemption, it was argued, also did
not extend to “employment of individuals whose primary duties consisted of something other than” core religious activities.68
This argument ignores two aspects of the provision. First, it ignores
the common-sense fact that virtually all religious organizations possess a primary purpose to engage in religious worship or spread a religious doctrine, even if such doctrine is in the form of service to the
community. Second, regarding religious activity, this position ignores
the absence of a relevant narrowing principle to preclude religious
organizations from claiming the exemption under the pretense that a
“gay lifestyle” disrupts the “teaching or spreading religious doctrine
or belief.” A critical examination of the provision shows that its parts,
notwithstanding its facial language, are tantamount to a wholesale
exemption, when paired with the judicial review preclusion provision.
Importantly, the 2009 ENDA bill finally amended the religious exemption provision to be consistent with Title VII, which more reasonably
provides LGBT people with robust civil rights protections.
The history of ENDA’s broad religious organization exemption is a
breath-taking development in civil rights law. It is difficult to imagine
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, granting blanket exemptions
to Southern states. Such broad exceptions, as drafted in the 2007 and
prior ENDA bills, exclude many LGBT people who wish to work at
religious and religiously-affiliated organizations. This has been particularly onerous as the religious for-profit industry grows into a vast
Cir. 2007) (explaining that core religious beliefs must be ‘sincerely held’ to fall within Free Exercise
Clause).
65
See Watts v. Florida Intern. Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11th Cir. 2007) (explaining that core religious beliefs must be ‘sincerely held’ to fall within Free Exercise Clause).
66
See, e.g., Memorandum from Drew Asbby and Matt Clark, American Center for Law & Justice,
to Drew Ryan and Erik Zimmerman, American Center for Law & Justice on the Employment
Non-Discrimination Act of 2007 5 (May 1, 2007), available at http://www.advanceusa.org/pdf/
ENDA _Memo.pdf.
67
Id.
68
Id.
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enterprise69 to include gyms,70 music labels and publishing houses.71
Worse, it is a remarkable example of religious over-accommodation in
policy-making that is unsettling for civil rights supporters.
Conservative Christian political organizations, known collectively
as the “Religious Right,”72 possess significant political capital that
likely influenced ENDA’s religious exemption construction over the
last sixteen years. This political movement is led by a number of wellfinanced and visible organizations, such as Focus on the Family and
the Family Research Council.73 These and other related organizations
have vigorously opposed LGBT civil rights, effectively slowing federal
legislative efforts to extend rights to LGBT people.74 ENDA has also
met strong opposition from the Religious Right. In 2009, the National
Religious Broadcasters testified before the Senate, arguing that the current Title VII-like exemption is “fatally insufficient” to protect religious
employers.75
Religious Right organizations oppose ENDA and other LGBT civil
rights laws based on a Christian evangelical belief that homosexuality
is immoral.76 The nexus among sexuality, gender identity, workplace
See Mega Churches Mean Big Business, CNN, Jan. 21, 2010, available at http://www.cnn.
com/2010/WORLD/americas/01/21/religion.mega.church.christian/index.html (detailing that
mega-churches make about $6.5 million a year and can accommodate up to 15,000 people).
70
See Lisa L. Colangelo, United Presbyterian Church Pays Bills pays bills with Rock Fitness Center
for Body and Soul, N.Y. Daily News (May 8, 2010), available at http://www.nydailynews.com/
ny_local/queens/2010/05/09/2010-05-09_united_presbyterian_church_pays_bills_with_rock_
fitness_center_for_body_and_soul.html (noting that the church now shares its building with the
Fitness Center to cover maintenance costs).
71
See Luisa Kroll, Christian Capitalism: Megachurches, Megabusinesses, Forbes (Sept. 17, 2003),
available at http://www.forbes.com/2003 /09/17/cz_lk_0917megachurch.html (listing the vast
enterprises of mega-churches, including record deals, television programs, and books sold at
Walmart, Costco, Barnes and Noble, and Borders).
72
See, e.g., William Martin, With God on Our Side: the rise of the Religious Right in
America (1996) (tracing the old Religious Right movement, which was borne in the 1960s, and its
evolution into the New Religious Right, which carries on the conservative political mantel to forge
Christian power in politics as part of a righteous vision to restore traditional “American” values).
73
See Bill Berkowitz, Religious Right Bringing in ‘More Money Than Ever,’ IPS News (Dec. 21, 2007),
available at http://ipsnews.net/ print.asp?idnews=40575) (listing the amount of money amassed
by Focus on Families and similar organizations) Focus on Families took in $142.2 million in 2006;
Focus on Families Action, $14.6 million; the Family Research Council, $10.3 million; the Alliance
Defense Fund, $26.1 million; American Family Association, $16.9 million; and CBN, $236.3
million.
74
See Cece Cox, To Have or To Hold — Or Not: The Influence of the Christian Right on Gay Marriage
Laws in the Netherlands, Canada, and the United States, 14 Law & Sexuality: Rev. Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual & Transgender Legal Issues 1, 40-47 (2005) (explaining that the Religious Right played
an instrumental role in blocking gay marriage in the United States as compared to other countries
that extended marriage rights to LGBT people who did not have strong conservative religious
opposition).
75
E.g., Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2009: Hearing of S. 1584 Before the Sen. Comm. on
Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, 111th Cong. (2009) (written testimony of Craig L. Parshall, Senior
Vice-President and General Counsel of the National Religious Broadcasters), available at http://
content.nrb.org/ webdocs/Advocacy/ENDA_Senate_Test_11_2009.pdf.
76
See, e.g., Family Research Council, Help Stop the ENDA. Religious Liberty, http://www.frc.org/
get.cfm?i=AL10D01 (“ENDA will give Washington liberals virtually unlimited power to force ev69
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protection, and morality is unclear,77 but Religious Right organizations
have long-advanced the position that civil rights laws that mandate
non-discrimination infringe religious freedom.78 ENDA’s perceived
threat is even more deeply felt as the religious exemption has been
narrowed to Title VII’s scope. Few other religious voices have taken
the anti-LGBT civil rights mantel like the conservative Christian bloc,79
have been as consistently vocal against ENDA,80 suggesting that the
Religious Right has been a driving force behind the religious exemption since ENDA’s inception. This comment will not elaborate on the
Religious Right’s long-fought opposition to ENDA; however, it is
important to emphasize that a particular religious constituency has
profoundly influenced ENDA’s religious exemption. Lawmakers have
catered to this specific constituency in the past, but finally seem willing
to abandon its past over-accommodation.

III. Tipping the Balance Toward Religious
Over-Accommodation
In Lemon v. Amos, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor noted:
These cases involve a Government decision to lift from
a nonprofit activity of a religious organization the burden of demonstrating that the particular nonprofit activity is religious as well as the burden of refraining from
discriminating on the basis of religion . . . [I]n my view
the objective observer should perceive the Government
action as an accommodation of the exercise of religion
rather than as a Government endorsement of religion.81
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence highlighted the long-debated tension between First Amendment principles that constitutionally permit
the federal government to uphold the free exercise of religion, and, at
ery business with more than 15 employees to embrace immoral sexual behavior as normal and
worthy of celebration . . . or face harsh federal sanctions.”).
77
Infra Part II.
78
See James Tillman, New Documentary on Homosexual Threat to Religious Freedom, Lifesitenews.
com (May 13, 2010) (reporting on a Family Research Council documentary warning about ENDA’s
threat to religious freedom to reject homosexuality as moral).
79
See supra note 26 (describing the Religious Right as a fundamentalist, conservative Christian
coalition).
80
See, e.g., supra note 26 (Parshall from the National Religious Broadcasters, a Religious Right programming organization, is the only other religious group represented at the hearings other than
the Reform Jewish organization, as it served as a nominal voice for the conservative bloc for the
most recent round of ENDA hearings; other Religious Right organizations have testified against
the bill in the past).
81
Amos, 483 U.S. at 348–49 (concurring opinion).
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the same time, mandate against excessive entanglement with religion.82
The First Amendment seemingly creates a balance in its limited text,
which provides, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”83 However,
the meaning behind the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause
regarding federal statutory regulation is a constant subject of debate.84
The theoretical balance between these two principles — government’s preservation of free religious exercise and its limitations — creates a tension that sometimes makes them competing principles.85 In
the context of LGBT rights and religious organizations that object to
homosexuality, lawmakers are forced to choose which rights to more
firmly secure. Based on ENDA’s former blanket exceptions it appears
as if this choice has been relatively easy, but as LGBT relationships
becomes normalized, lawmakers had to approach a fairer balance. This
section will discuss judicial interpretations of the Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses, examine the principles’ tensions within LGBT
civil rights, analyze the nexus between First Amendment principles
with employment, and conclude by arguing that ENDA’s previous
exemptions over-accommodated certain religious organizations.
A. The Establishment Clause and Religious Freedom Tightrope
Courts have been called upon to discern the Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses meanings because the United States Constitution
provides precious little textual guidance regarding Congress’ role in
upholding religious freedom and avoiding its entanglement with religion.86 The Establishment Clause contains a much clearer jurisprudential history than the Free Exercise Clause, yet the relationship between
these clauses in case application remains equivocal.
The leading case interpreting the Establishment Clause in a government regulatory context is Lemon v. Kurtzman, decided in 1971.87
Id. at 346–49.
U.S. Const. amend. I.
84
See, generally, Daniel Conkle, Constitutional law: the religion clauses (2d ed. 2009); Eugene
Volokh, The religion clauses and related statutes: problems, cases, and policy arguments (2006); Jesse Choper, Securing religious liberty: principles for judicial interpretation of the religion clauses (1995).
85
The prevalent view among law scholars is that the Religion Clauses are often in conflict. See
Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Pitt.
L. Rev. 673, 673-701 (1980) (explaining the courts have developed independent jurisprudence to
harmonize the Religion Clauses despite their seemingly disparate mandates). In my view, the
Religion Clauses are not necessarily in conflict; instead, they create the confines between which
the government must reasonably balance. This perspective, unlike the prevalent view, appears
throughout the essay.
86
See Kent Greenawalt, Secularism, Religion, and Liberal Democracy in the United States, 30 Cardozo
L. Rev. 2383, 2392–2400 (2009) (explaining that the Constitution’s Religion Clauses fail to inform
the law as to religion’s proper governmental and public roles).
87
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
82
83
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The case created a three-part test designed to “draw lines with reference to the three main evils against which the Establishment Clause
was intended to afford protection: ‘sponsorship, financial support, and
active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.’”88 The Lemon
test requires that a statute must have a secular legislative purpose; contain a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
it must not foster an “excessive entanglement” with religion.89 The
Burger Court broadly construed the Establishment Clause’s purpose,
in which a statute that “respects” religion may be impermissible if it
may lead to state religious endorsement.90
Later Establishment Clause cases have elaborated on the Lemon
test’s final element — excessive entanglement — as an inquiry into “the
character and purposes of the benefited institutions, the nature of the
aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the
government and religious authority.”91 The “entanglement” element
is generally viewed as the government’s attempt to maintain neutrality toward religion.92 Some courts, where appropriate, have utilized
Justice O’Connor’s “refined Lemon test”93 which replaces the entanglement element with the “endorsement test” that holds “the government
impermissibly endorses religion if its conduct has either (1) the purpose
or (2) the effect of conveying a message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred.”94 Therefore, governmental action
that appears to endorse or disapprove of religion from the perspective
of an objective and informed observer is violative of the Establishment
Clause.95
The Free Exercise Clause is usually interpreted as protecting against
infringements against individuals’ religious beliefs or practice.96 A free
exercise religious claim must only show that it is religious in nature
and sincerely held belief.97 The criterion to determine whether a proffered belief is religious is governed by a three-factor test, including
“an attempt to address fundamental and ultimate questions involving
deep and imponderable matters; a comprehensive belief system; and
Id. at 612 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
Id. at 613.
90
Id. at 612.
91
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 206 (1997). See also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005);
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 793–94 (2000).
92
McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005).
93
See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–94 (1984) (concurring opinion) (using the refined
Lemon test).
94
See, e.g., Bauchman for Bauchman v. West High School, 132 F.3d 542, 551 (10th Cir. 1997) (applying Justice O’Connor’s refined analysis).
95
See Catholic League for Religious & Civil Rights v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 567 F.3d
595 (9th Cir. 2009); Green v. Haskell Cnty. Bd. Board of Com’rs, 568 F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2009).
96
See School Dist. of Abington Tp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
97
See Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2003); U.S. v. DeWitt, 95 F.3d 1374 (8th Cir. 1996);
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
88
89
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the presence of formal and external signs like clergy and observance of
holidays.”98
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on governmental regulatory
interests related to religious freedom is uneven. In Sherbert v. Verner,99
the Court held that a government must possess a compelling interest
in its religious exercise regulation.100 Nearly thirty years later, the Court
changed course in Employment Division v. Smith by permitting governmental action merely to be neutral toward religion.101 Congress restored
the Verner strict scrutiny requirement for governmental regulation
in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act102 in 1993. Yet the Supreme
Court, in City of Boerne v. Flores, ruled the Act’s application to state and
local governments as unconstitutional on the grounds that its remedial
reach was incongruent to achieve its ends.103 This jurisprudential history is instructive on individual religious freedom issues but may not
fully inform religious organization protections, particularly in light of
secular civil rights regulation.104
The closest courts have come is placing limitations on the governmental role to preserve individual religious beliefs. In Bowen v. Roy,
the Supreme Court argued that the First Amendment does not “require
the Government itself to behave in ways that the individual believes
will further his or her spiritual development or that of his or her family” (italics in original).105 This form of over-accommodation is rejected
in recent federal Circuit cases, such as Cornerstone Christian Schools
v. University Interscholastic League,106 which held that a not-for-profit,
inter-collegiate organization’s regulatory preclusion of non-public
school participation did not infringe on the plaintiff’s religious right to
enroll his son in private school.107 Federal courts’ rationales in Roy and
Cornerstone reinforce the necessary balance between reasonable and
unreasonable accommodation.
The federal government, within a constitutional context, occupies a precarious role as the removed protector of religious freedom.
Moreover, as Congress legislates within a pluralistic society, it becomes
increasingly difficult to reconcile this dual role. Accordingly, the tenId. at 251 (quoting Africa v. Commonwealth of Pa., 662 F.2d 1025, 1030 (3d Cir. 1981) (describing
three indicia of religion).
99
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
100
Id. at 404.
101
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
102
42 U.S.C. § 2000b(b).
103
521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997).
104
See Stephen D. Smith, The Jurisdictional Establishment Clause, A Reappraisal, 81 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 1844 (2006) (arguing that competing views about the government’s regulatory role in safeguarding religious freedom are emerging that advance the position that the Establishment Clause
only meant to restrict federal endorsement of state religion — not all governmental endorsement).
105
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986).
106
563 F.3d 127 (5th Cir. 2009).
107
Id. at 135.
98
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sion between the religion clauses surfaces in the federal government’s
institutional law-making capacity.108 Should Congress fully accommodate religious organizations as a constitutional right or should it protect
religious organizations as a discretionary matter, if at all?109 Religious
exemption critics have argued that they are unwise policy choices.110
This essay does not take a position on religious exemptions per se;
rather, it seeks to examine its meaning within the ENDA for LGBT people and other justice-seeking groups. The religious exemption issue is
of interest because it emphasizes the deep tension living between the
religion clauses and civil rights progress.
B. Reconciling Religious Freedom and LGBT Rights
Attitudes toward LGBT people and rights have changed considerably from ENDA’s inception in 1994. Today, Americans are relatively
divided on the morality of same-sex relationships111 and LGBT rights,
including marriage and open military service.112 Opinions, however,
are trending more favorably for LGBT rights, despite overall opposition.113 Traditionally, Abrahamic religions’ teachings reinforce that
homosexuality is sinful but within the United States, a majority of
“mainline” Protestants now believe that homosexuality is an acceptable way of life.114 Certain denominations have even welcomed LGBT
See Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DePaul L. Rev. 1 (2001)
(explaining that the government’s rights arbiter role poses difficulty when it is responsible for
allocating or protecting conflicting interests).
109
Id.
110
See Frederick M. Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibility of Religious
Exemptions, 20 U.A.L.R. L. J. 555 (1998); Angela C. Carmella, Responsible Freedom Under the Religion
Clauses: Exemptions, Legal Pluralism, and the Common Good, 110 W. Va. L. Rev. 403 (2008). But see
Laura S. Underkuffler, Religious Exemptions and the Common Good: A Reply to Professor Carmella, 110
W. Va. L. Rev. 449 (2008). See also Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Religious
Freedom and the Constitution (2007) (arguing against religious exemptions because they are
unfair to non-religious people).
111
See Gallup Organization, Americans Evenly Divided on Morality of Homosexuality
(2008) available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/ 108115/Americans-Evenly-Divided-MoralityHomosexuality.aspx (reporting that 48% of survey participants considered homosexuality to
be morally acceptable and 48% of survey participants considered homosexuality to be morally
wrong).
112
See Gallup Organization, Majority of Americans Continue to Oppose Same-Sex
Marriage (2009), available at http://www.gallup.com/ poll/118378/majority-americans-continue-oppose-gay-marriage.aspx (reporting that a slight majority — 57% — of survey participants
opposed same-sex marriage and 40% support same-sex marriage; support for same-sex marriage
is “significantly” higher than in 1996; sixty-nine percent of survey participants support open lesbian and gay military service).
113
See id. (reporting that sixty-seven percent of survey participants support hate crimes coverage
for LGBT people; sixty-seven percent support domestic partner healthcare coverage; and seventythree percent support partner inheritance rights).
114
See The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, Most Mainline Protestants Say Society
Should Accept Homosexuality (2009), available at http://pewforum.org/Gay-Marriage-andHomosexuality/Most-Mainline-Protestants-Say-Society-Should-Accept-Homosexuality.aspx (reporting that 56% of survey participants believed that homosexuality should be accepted).
108
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people, such as the Presbyterian Church,115 the Anglican Church,116
the United Church of Christ,117 and Reform Judaism.118 The American
Reconstructionist and Conservative Judaism faiths permit gay and
lesbian rabbis as well as same-sex marriage.119 LGBT people are gaining greater acceptance at the same time as their political movements
grow.120
America, nevertheless, remains one of the most religious nations
in the world.121 Americans attend religious worship services and contemplate religious questions at a higher rate than other industrialized
nations.122 While America is a decisively Christian nation, it is among
the most religiously diverse countries in the world as well.123 The inevitability of pluralistic divisions around LGBT protections and religious
freedom is clear when considering that the United States is among the
most deeply-religious, religiously diverse, and openly-gay populated
nations worldwide.124
It is important to first contextualize the tension between civil rights
and religious freedom as an historic one. LGBT people are not the first
115
See Human Rights Campaign, Stances of Faiths on LGBT Issues: Presbyterian Church (USA),
available at http://www.hrc.org/issues/ religion/5021.htm.
116
See Human Rights Campaign, Stances of Faiths on LGBT Issues: Episcopal Church, available at
http://www.hrc.org/issues/religion/ 4990.htm.
117
See Human Rights Campaign, Stances of Faiths on LGBT Issues: United Church of Christ, available at http://www.hrc.org/issues/religion/ 5055.htm.
118
See Employment Non-Discrimination Act Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Education and Labor, 111th
Cong. (2009) (statement of Rabbi David Saperstein) available at http://edlabor.house.gov/documents/111/pdf/testimony/ 20090923DavidSapersteinTestimony.pdf (“Our belief in ENDA’s importance stems from a core teaching shared by an array of faith traditions, Jewish and non-Jewish
alike. In the words of Genesis (1:27) ‘And God created humans in God’s own image, in the image
of God, God created them; male and female God created them.’ We oppose discrimination against
all individuals, including gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender men and women, for the stamp
of the divine is imprinted on the souls of each and every one of us.”).
119
See Alan Cooperman, Conservative Rabbis Allow Ordained Gays, Same-Sex Unions, Wash. Post, Dec.
7, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/06/
AR2006120601247.html (explaining that conservative rabbis fell short of endorsing same-sex marriage and homosexuality generally, but allowed for discretion when ordaining homosexual rabbis
and performing same-sex commitment ceremonies).
120
Perhaps the most visibly successful gay rights political movement is the gay marriage movement. Ironically one of the clear signs of its building strength was its backlash to it by some segments of the population. See Gilbert Herdt, Gay Marriage: The Panic and the Right in Moral panics,
sex panics: fear and fight over sexual rights 157–193 (2009) (describing President’s Bush reelection on an anti-gay marriage campaign and recent history in gay rights movement’s growth
and evolution that led to that particular political moment).
121
See Diane Swanbrow, U.S. one of the most religious countries, Univ. of Mich. News Service, Nov.
24, 2003, available at http://www.ur.umich.edu/ 0304/Nov24_03/15.shtml (reporting on a worldwide study conducted by the university, one of the leading polling universities in the world).
122
Id.
123
See Diana Eck, A New Religious America: How a “Christian Country” Has Become the
World’s Most Religious Diverse Nation (2001).
124
See The Williams Institute, Same-sex Couples and the Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual Population:
New Estimates from the American Community Survey (2006), available at http://www.law.
ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/ publications/SameSexCouplesandGLBpopACS.pdf (reporting that
there are at least 8.8 million lesbian and gay people in the United States).

Legislation & Policy Brief

75

group to experience religiously-justified discrimination. Religiosity
placed a significant role in slavery’s continuation and resistance for
black descendents.125 Southern whites, in particular, relied on Biblical
support to oppose slave emancipation.126 Religious LGBT civil rights
opposition is a distinctively unique position but it resonates with historical legacies in which some segments’ religious attitudes lagged
behind civil rights advancement.127 This history also demonstrates that
not every socio-political ethical belief is an enduring religious belief
that is preserved over time.
Courts also have served as a barrier to LGBT civil rights, especially
in terms of employment protection. ENDA is necessary because federal
courts have refused to extend sex-based Title VII protections to lesbian,
gay, and transgender people.128 In the seminal case, DeSantis v. Pacific
Telephone & Telegraph Co.,129 three gay males who each experienced
workplace discrimination had their Title VII petitions rejected by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, federal district court,
and Ninth Circuit, on the basis that the court lacked jurisdiction.130 The
Circuit Court’s rationale was that Congress only intended to incorporate “traditional notions” of sex under the Title VII prohibition.131
More recent court decisions have affirmed this interpretation,
even though other decisions have departed from the Court’s holding
See generally Religion and Slavery (Paul Finkelman ed.) (1989) (highlighting the vigorous
religious debate over slavery in early America).
126
See Rev. W.S. Brown, Preface to the Fifth Edition of Rev. Josiah Priest, Bible Defense of
Slavery; ororandor Origin Fortunes, and, History of the Negro Race, at vi (1852–1853) (“Is
it not time, then, that the South should begin to defend herself against the aggressions of these
time-serving votaries of error and fanaticism, and show to the world that her peculiar policy and
institutions are in harmony with the genius of republicanism, and the spirit of Christianity??!?
Believing that such is her true policy, and that this proposition is much more consistent and reasonable, as well as more easily established than its converse, we have been induced to give publicity to the following pages in vindication of Southern rights and institutions.”).
127
Religion and sexual identities have a complex relationship in which America has witnessed a
reversal in the primacy of these identities from the previous century where religion was once the
strongest identity that is now replaced by sexual and other identities. See William N. Eskridge
Jr., A Jurisprudence of “Coming Out”: Religion, Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality
in American Public Law, 106 Yale L.J. 2411, 2412 (1997) (“In this century, in fact, sexual orientation
has steadily been replacing religion as the identity characteristic that is both physically invisible
and morally polarizing. In 1900, one’s group identity was largely defined by one’s ethnicity, social
class, sex, and religion . . . . In 2000, one’s group identity will be largely defined by one’s race,
income, sex, and sexual orientation”). But see id. at 2412 (“America has internalized the idea of
benign religious variation, that there are a number of equally good religions, and one’s religion
says little or nothing about one’s moral or personal worth. The opposite is true of sexual orientation . . . . Most Americans reject the idea of benign sexual variation, that there are a number of
equally good sexual orientations, and that one’s sexuality says little or nothing about one’s moral
or personal worth.”). (citations omitted).
128
See Why DOMA and Not ENDA? A Review of Recent Federal Hostility to Expand Employment Rights
and Protection Beyond Traditional Notions (Note), 15 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L. J. 177, 181 (1998) (citing
examples of federal cases where the courts have refused to apply Title VII protections).
129
DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
130
See supra note 128, at 181.
131
608 F.2d 327, 392 (9th Cir. 1979).
125
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in DeSantis.132 The jurisprudence remains significantly uneven as to
whether Title VII’s “sex” protections are applicable to lesbians and gays.
Similarly, transgender and gender non-conforming people also maintain asymmetrical protection, depending on a variety of factors. These
include plaintiff’s gender identity and expression, whether the plaintiff
plans to transition genders, and other peculiarly conditional factors.133
Title VII’s legislative history has prevented LGBT people from claiming federal statutory protection against employment discrimination,134
which strengthens the urgency for which ENDA is being advocated by
LGBT advocates and lawmakers.
Scholars have weighed in on the inherent tension between religious
freedom and civil rights, particularly for LGBT people.135 Professor Chai
Feldblum, a prominent voice on LGBT policy and morality, explains
that liberal political theory locates proper governmental action in the
safeguarding individuals’ rights to pursue their conception of a “good”
moral life, rather than endorsing a specific normative moral position
on the “good” life.136 She goes on to argue that there must be “something more” than a law’s moral assessment to illegitimately burden
individuals’ “belief liberty.”137 Failure to acknowledge that laws carry

132
See Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004) (rehearing en banc denied) (Oct. 18,
2004) (holding that employee’s allegations of discrimination based upon gender non-conforming
behavior were actionable under Title VII); Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., 256 F.3d
864 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding employer liable for harassment of former homosexual employee).
133
See Katie Koch & Richard Bales, Transgender Employment Non-Discrimination, 17 U.C.L.A.
Women’s L.J. 243, 250–62 (2008) (arguing that transgender should be included in the definition of
“sex” like pregnancy is and citing state court examples of such construction).
134
See supra note 128, at 186 (citing federal court holding that Title VII does not protect employees
from sexual orientation discrimination).
135
See, e.g., Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt From Civil Rights Laws?, 48 B.C. L.
Rev. 781, 786 (2007) (civil rights protect both religious rights and sexual rights which may be in
conflict); Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Liberty: Gay Rights and Religion, 72 Brook. L. Rev.
61, 63 (2006) (advocates of non-discrimination support equality whereas the other may seek religious freedom); Josiah N. Drew, Caught Between the Scylla and Charybdis: Ameliorating the Collision
Course of Sexual Orientation Anti-discrimination Rights and Religious Free Exercise Rights in the Public
Workplace, 16 B.Y.U. J. Pub. L. 287, 300 (2002); (“gay rights advocates should turn toward, rather
than away from religion”); Jack M. Battaglia, supra note 53.
136
See Chai Feldblum, supra note 135, at 84 (“major liberal political theory postulates that morality is not the proper objective of government action”). Commentators have also argued that
the normative value of governmental neutrality is challenged when individuals invoke religious
exemptions for idiosyncratic religious beliefs or practices. See Religious Exemptions and the Limits
of Neutrality (Note) 74 Tex. L. Rev. 120 (1996) (“It is tempting to think that neutrality forbids the
government from making any normative judgments when religion is at issue. If we indulge this
temptation, we will be inclined to insist that courts disregard the extent to which a party seeking a mandatory exemption on religious grounds embraces beliefs or values that deviate from
familiar religious beliefs or values. But the notion of neutrality cannot possibly relieve us of the
task of bringing normative concerns to bear on the views of those who seek mandatory religion
exemptions.”).
137
Id. at 89–122.
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moral assessments and alienate some members of society’s beliefs, she
argues, is intellectually dishonest, and ignores reality.138
Feldblum’s analysis leads to other scholars’ religious exemption
critiques. As a backdrop to these critiques, Louis Fisher observes,
“[w]hile constitutional limits apply to the creation of statutory protections for religious purposes, the courts have not invalidated any of
the special exemptions adopted by Congress.”139 Fisher contends that
the responsibility for safeguarding religious freedom is shared among
courts, governmental institutions, and political forces that apply pressure to government.140 The Constitution’s high value on civil rights and
religious freedom produces high stakes for policy choices that must
express a moral preference one way or the other.141
Conversely, some commentators have pointed out that LGBT nondiscrimination laws and religious freedom protections seek similar
goals: to exercise a negative right to free expression, and to invoke positive right against infringement.142 Professor William Eskridge, for this
reason, advances a comparative-need accommodation approach that
allows parties to mediate their differences toward a mutually beneficial resolution.143 This approach, in other words, seeks to ascertain the
core needs of conflicting parties and to accommodate these identified
needs. This approach is useful because it moves away from the dichotomous framework placed around these interests, although it is unclear
how this approach can be institutionalized within federal statutory
regulation.
Importantly, there still remain divergent views about how to reconcile LGBT civil rights and religious freedom interests. Most commentator suggestions, however, fall into three categories: 1) the preservation
or elimination of religious exemptions or adjustment of their scope; 2)
mediation as a methodological remedy; and 3) alternative, non-religious accommodations. The following section of this comment will further evaluate this tension within the area of employment.

Id. at 89. Professor Feldblum also criticizes gay rights leaders for claiming that LGBT civil rights
laws are morally neutral. See Chai Feldblum, Moral Rhetoric of Legislation, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 992, 996
(1997).
139
Louis Fisher, Statutory Exemptions for Religious Freedom, 44 J. Church & St. 291 (2002).
140
Id.
141
See Laura K. Klein, Rights Clash: How Conflicts Between Gays Rights and Religious Freedoms
Challenge the Legal System, 98 Geo. L.J. 505, 514–18 (2010) (framing the religious exemption debate
for LGBT rights as which side should be accommodated most of the time as most scholars agree
that a narrow exception should exist).
142
See, e.g., supra note 127, at 2430. (“state should be encouraged to prohibit private censorship or
discrimination on the basis of religion or sexual orientation.”).
143
Id. at 2449–54.
138
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C. The Issue of Religious Exemption Nexus: Dissecting the
Compelling Interest for Religious Exemption under ENDA

Many scholarly debates on LGBT civil rights and religious freedom
address the issue of same-sex marriage.144 The issue of employment, in
contrast, only tangentially implicates faith-based beliefs. The relevance
of religious freedom arguments is diminished when the civil rights in
question indirectly relate to religion because the attenuation between
religious belief and infringement is remote. The scope of religious freedom is broad but not unconstrained.145 The Supreme Court has consistently held that when the federal government creates a neutral law that
incidentally burdens the free exercise of a particular religious practice
or belief, it does not infringe on an individual’s free religious exercise.
146
Chai Feldblum’s “belief liberty” theory is central to an accommodationist analysis that seeks to balance state religious endorsement,
religious freedom, and non-discrimination rights, specifically when
addressing employment non-discrimination for LGBT people.
Most Americans believe that LGBT people face “a lot” of
discrimination,147 more in fact, than any other group.148 A majority
of religiously-identified people subscribes to this belief as well.149 A
poll on transgender discrimination reported that 37% of transgender
survey participants felt as if they had experienced discrimination.150
Consequently, most Americans oppose employment discrimination
against lesbians and gays, and a comparable percentage of people support protections for transgender people.151 Apart from morally-charged
questions related to marriage, most people feel as if LGBT individuals ought to have the right to work free of discrimination. These data
strongly suggest that opposition to LGBT workplace discrimination
protection is not religiously based, but instead based upon ethically
informed political beliefs.
144
See, e.g., Martha Minow, supra note 135; Chai Feldblum, supra note 135; Koppelman, infra note
161.
145
See supra notes 105-107.
146
See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993);
Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 879 (if a law is neutral and generally applicable, but incidentally
affects religion, it need not satisfy a compelling state interest to survive constitutional scrutiny).
147
See The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life & The Pew Research Center for the
People and the Press, Most Still Oppose Same Sex Marriage, Majority Continue to
Support Civil Unions 8 (2009) (64%) available at http://pewforum.org/uploadedfiles/Topics/
Issues/Gay_ Marriage_and_Homosexuality/samesexmarriage09.pdf.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
See Nat’l Gay & Lesbian Task Force Action Fund, Passing the Employment NonDiscrimination Act: A Toolkit 5 (2009) available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/enda07/
ENDAtoolkit_c4.pdf.
151
Id. at 7 (reporting that 61% of Americans support transgender employment non-discrimination
laws).
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ENDA seeks to provide such protection against widespread
anti-LGBT discrimination. Its purpose is to “address the history and
widespread pattern of irrational discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation or gender identity by private sector employers and local,
State, and Federal government employers.”152 Similarly, Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act was enacted to make illegal employment practices that
“fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .”153 The goal to
eliminate employment discrimination does not in itself offend religious
views. It may offend privacy interests of those who are uncomfortable
with LGBT people, yet privacy interests are not synonymous to religiosity, particularly within a constitutional context.
It is, after all, neither possible nor desirable to accommodate ethical beliefs — rational or not — that LGBT people simply should not
exist. Some ENDA opponents may characterize their objection to LGBT
romantic orientation toward members of the same gender or orientation toward a particular gender identity or expression. In other words,
it is the romantic act or gender presentation that is believed to be sinful.154 Be that as it may, an ethical commitment to opposite sex love
or gender conformity is not necessarily a religious belief. In most religious freedom cases, courts shy away from dissecting the veracity of a
religious claim,155 but in some cases where the civil rights interests are
especially strong, it is reasonable to further inquire to the nature of the
belief.
Some scholars take purported religious beliefs against employment
protection for granted. Andrew Koppelman, in his well-known article,
You Can’t Hurry: Love Why Anti-Discrimination Protections for Gay People
Should Have Religious Exemptions, argues for religious exemptions of
LGBT civil rights laws based on the rationale that “forced association
with gay people” will amount to a tangible harm and prevent those
who oppose homosexuality from living honestly with their values.156
This line of reasoning borders on absurdity for two primary reasons: First, it entirely ignores historical discrimination against other
152
H.R. 2981, 111th Cong. § 2(1) (1st Sess. 2009) available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
billtext.xpd?bill=h111-2981.
153
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(1)
154
See, e.g., Americans for Truth About Homosexuality, Tell Congress You Oppose ENDA — The
‘ENDA’ Our Freedom’ Bill, available at http://americansfortruth.com/news/tell-congress-youoppose-enda-the-enda-our-freedom-bill.html (eliciting opposition to ENDA on the basis that the
gay agenda is attempting to pass an oppressive law that threaten to silence religious freedom to
voice the self-evident truth that homosexuality is sinful).
155
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
156
Andrew Koppelman, You Can’t Hurry Love: Why Antidiscrimination Protections For Gay People
Should Have Religious Exemptions, 72 Brook. L. Rev. 125, 135 (2007).
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groups currently protected under employment non-discrimination
laws. Indeed, “forced association” with blacks likely posed discomfort
to some Whites who held racial animus towards blacks. Some whites,
in fact, had to learn to coexist with Blacks as equals, which required a
level of uneasy “dishonesty” for a time. Yet forced association alone
does not sanction mistreatment as precluded by non-discrimination
laws. Uncomfortable co-existence is sometimes a fact of life that privileged groups must endure for the sake of progress, for which conservative Christians and other religious people are no exception.
Second, Koppelman treats employment discrimination and discomfort arising from forced association as comparable when these
experiences are clearly not similar. Such a position is hard to take seriously as joblessness leads to endemic poverty among lesbians and
gays, particularly transgender people.157 Further, persistent discrimination experienced by LGBT routinely leads to mental health illness and
suicide.158 Merely disliking your co-workers based on divergent ethical
views is hardly a basis to justify broad religious organization exemptions. Koppelman’s foundational argument reveals a libertarian preference for not working with LGBT people that is a far cry from religious
orthodoxy.
An overbroad religious exemption in ENDA potentially undermines the law’s goal to eradicate discrimination. The absence of a
bona fide occupational qualification — a narrow Title VII defense that
allows employers to justify its discrimination under statute — invites
employers to discriminate for any religious reason.159 The broad religious exemption in earlier versions of ENDA sends a mixed message
to the courts by asking “if Congress really intended to stamp out sexual
orientation discrimination, why are religious groups above it?”160 The
most recent ENDA version does not appear to contain a BFOQ defense
under Title VII’s 703(e)(1).161 Therefore, ENDA’s previously broad religious exemption was equivalent to a generous BFOQ defense162 that
buffered the employment sector most likely to justify discrimination
See supra note 130.
See Kristen K. Clements-Nolle, Rani Marx & Mitchell Katz, Attempted Suicide Among Transgender
Persons: The Influence of Gender-Based Discrimination and Victimization, gender-based discrimination
and victimization, J. Homosexuality 53, 53-69 (2006) (presenting research to illustrate increases in
mental illness due to discrimination and victimization).
159
See J. Banning Jasiunas, Is ENDA the Answer? Can a “Separate But Equal” Federal Statute Adequately
Protect Gays and Lesbians from Employment Discrimination? 61 Ohio St. L.J. 1529, 1553 (2000); Jack
M. Battaglia, supra note 53, at 227-28.
160
Id.
161
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(e)(1).
162
See Kate B. Rhodes, Defending ENDA: The Ramifications of Omitting the BFOQ Defense in the
Employment in the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 19 Law & Sexuality 1, 29 (2010) (“The most
puzzling aspect of ENDA’s lack of a BFOQ defense is the absence of any real debate or concerns
about its inclusion or exclusion. The BFOQ defense has been a vital part of Title VII, and is often,
but unsuccessfully, asserted as an affirmative defense. Including a BFOQ defense would enable
ENDA to mirror more closely Title VII, which floor debates have indicated to be the intent of
157
158
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against LGBT people against the law’s application, and validated the
untenable view that all religious organizations maintain a legitimate
interest in LGBT discrimination.
ENDA opponents have been unable to articulate a reasonable
nexus between religious belief and LGBT workplace discrimination.
Upon deconstructing moral claims that merely working with LGBT
people will offend deeply held religious beliefs, it becomes clear that
such claims are libertarian, not religious claims. These proto-religious
claims do not rise to the level of substantial burden that may occur
when the government makes it religiously impossible to exercise a belief
or practice.163 Impossibility is not the Free Exercise Clause standard but
instead provides a comparative lens from which to assess ethical discomfort claims. Religious organizations that view homosexual acts as
immoral or gender non-conformity as unnatural do not suffer a substantial burden in merely having openly gay or transgender within
their professional environments.
D. The Risk of Religious Organization Exemption
Over-Accommodation
ENDA’s religious exemptions prior to 2009 were broad not only in
a statutory sense but also in more general legal sense. These exemptions lacked a narrowing principle, such as Title VII’s restriction on
religious discrimination, or a BFOQ. Moreover, the legislative history failed to demonstrate a reasonable nexus between religiosity and
employment discrimination.164 The exemption’s overreach and lack of
nexus alone suggest that such an exemption would not survive strict
scrutiny review.
However, the previous exemptions also may have violated the religious clauses. The operative presumption embedded into the exemption’s construction was that all religious organizations may object to
LGBT moral choices to lead open and honest lives. This presumption is
false, as discussed earlier, because some religious institutions and organizations support LGBT equality.165 It then follows that the religious
exemptions sought to accommodate a particular religious sub-group
Congress. However, excluding a BFOQ defense would better effectuate the purpose of ENDA, to
eliminate sexual orientation discrimination in employment.”).
163
See Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of Religious Exemptions — A Research Agenda with Test
Suites, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 595, 654–55 (2000) (stating that in some religious freedom cases that
objectors find themselves in a quandary in which a particular act to be legally permissible but
religiously impermissible; this impermissibly however is closely related to a sincerely-held religious belief, such as a prisoner maintaining a kosher diet when the prison does not offer any
kosher-options).
164
This is my conclusion after primarily reviewing the three legislative hearings on ENDA during
its fourteen-year history. See supra note 31, 39, & 79.
165
See supra notes 115–117.
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— conservative Christians — who aggressively opposed the bill.166 The
natural extension of this argument is that the sweeping scope of prior
ENDA versions’ religious exemptions aimed to over-accommodate a
particular religious sub-group — an accommodation that in is violation
of the Establishment Clause.
Recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence supports the view that
government endorsement may take the form of statutory exceptionalism. Justice O’Connor’s refining of the Lemon test is instructive. If a regulation’s purpose conveys a message that a particular religious belief
is favored or preferred, it then violates the Establishment Clause.167
ENDA’s previous religious exemption was premised on a particular religious belief, maintained by some conservative Christians, that
L.G.B. sexual acts are immoral. Its purpose was to shield this religious
segment’s organizations from ENDA compliance. Such an accommodation tips the delicate Establishment Clause and Free Exercise balance
toward State religious endorsement.
This perspective is supported by the fact that other statutory
schemes strike a better balance between accommodation and civil
rights. A broad ministerial exception is a reasonable approach, similar
to the one within the 2009 version of ENDA or the District of Columbia’s
same-sex marriage law. Congress’ policy choice against a narrower
exemption is an affirmative entanglement with a particular religious
belief. Whether such a belief is deeply held is irrelevant in this context.
A favorable expression of a religious belief satisfies O’Connor’s Lemon
“endorsement” test.
The inquiry then turns to whether the religious exemption advances
a secular purpose and whether its endorsement is merely incidental to
achieving its secular purpose.168 The religious exemption, by definition,
does not serve a secular purpose. Courts have explained that lawmakers must exercise great caution in carving religious exemptions in neutral statutes because “such exemptions could become first steps toward
advancing religion or could entangle Government in repeated religious
inquiries, results proscribed by establishment clause.”169 In ENDA’s
case, it is the breadth and context of the religious exemption that
advances a particular religious view, though the 2007 version sought
A well-known conservative Christian advocacy group, Focus on the Family, is one among
many evangelical organizations that have publicly expressed its virulent opposition to ENDA.
See Focus on the Family, Letter to Congress, Sept. 2, 2009, available at http://fota.cdnetworks.
net/pdfs/2009-09-02-enda-letter.pdf (arguing that the religious liberty threat posed by ENDA is a
“litigation minefield”).
167
See supra note 76.
168
See American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky v. Grayson County, Ky., 591 F.3d 837, 845 (6th
Cir. 2010); Newdow v. Rio Linda Union School Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1076 (9th Cir. 2010); Freedom
From Religion Found. Inc. v. Obama, WL 1499451 at 13 (W.D. Wis. 2010).
169
See Abdool-Rashaad v. Seiter, 690 F.Supp. 598, 601 (S.D. Ohio 1987).
166
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to guard against religious inquiries prohibited by the Establishment
Clause with its judicial review provision.170
ENDA’s over accommodation of an arguable religious viewpoint
violates the Establishment Clause. Critics may make two points. First,
critics may raise the point that the exemption cannot endorse any religious viewpoint because it is a virtual blanket exemption. This fact
is accurate at first-blush. However, based on the legislative history
and public advocacy positions of extreme Christian conservatives, an
informed observer can easily read the exemption’s purpose. Second,
critics may argue that an exemption logically cannot advance a viewpoint because it is a negative action. On the contrary, a policy choice
to grant an exemption within a generally applicable neutral law is an
affirmative act that benefited a small but growing Christian organizational community, at the very least. It is further argued that ENDA’s
religious immunization expressed a preference among the many religiously informed, ethical views that exist on homosexuality and association that amounts to a government endorsement. Regardless of
Congress’s attempt to make the previous exemptions seem as though
they were neutral, it is unlikely that such treatment of certain religious
organizations would survive strict scrutiny because it is a thinly veiled
accommodation to religious organizations that would simply prefer to
pretend that LGBT people do not exist.
Other scholars have suggested alternatives to statutory religious
exemptions. One suggestion centers on the power of meditation to cure
employment conflicts. Jennifer Brown argues that meditation holds
“great promise” for resolving gay rights and religious liberty disputes
because it allows parties to extract the fundamentality of the tension.171
Plus, she observes that mediation can dovetail differences rather than
emphasizing them because “[m]ediation, much more than litigation,
can deploy core values within Christian or LGBT experience to create
empathy and shared understanding between the parties.”172 Another
approach suggests that some religious organizations’ needs can be met
with relational privacy exemptions. Similar exemptions currently exist
for small businesses with fifteen or fewer employees under Title VII.173
Ultimately, ENDA’s religious organizations exemptions — especially
the bill’s older versions — are political accommodations more so than
legal ones mandated under the First Amendment.
The primary objective behind examining ENDA’s previous religious exemptions is to explain how over accommodation can turn into
See supra note 59.
See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Peacemaking in the Culture War Between Gay Rights and Religious
Liberty, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 747 (2010) (arguing that the culture war between gay rights and religious
liberty does not need to be a zero-sum game).
172
Id. at 800.
173
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
170
171
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religious exceptionalism. It is deeply troubling that a powerful religious community and political machine can influence public policy in
a way to insulate it entirely from civil rights laws. Undoubtedly, religious freedom ought to be vigorously protected, but such protections
should not exceed reasonability to accommodate a particular group’s
relational preference at the expense of LGBT individuals’ livelihoods.
Exceptional treatment of this kind violates vital First Amendment
principles, and it is, candidly, a poor policy. Whether LGBT advocates
expressly targeted ENDA’s religious organization exemption or lawmakers tracking the political winds narrowed its scope, it is a victory
for LGBT individuals and other marginalized individuals seeking civil
rights protection.

IV. Challenging Conservatives’ Entitlement to
Religious Exceptionalism
It is imperative that a balance is maintained between the religion
clauses because equilibrium ensures governmental fairness within a
pluralistic religious and otherwise diverse democracy. The over accommodation of particular religious communities undermines the fragile
balance between religious fairness and freedom. In terms of striking
this balance and achieving civil rights progress, religious favoritism,
in the form of religious exceptionalism, is an iniquitous setback that
equally threatens religious freedom, religious fairness, and civil rights
advancement.
It is unclear how broadly courts will read the religious exemption
in the 2009 version of ENDA or its potential impact on LGBT people
who wish to work in religious organizations. It can be argued that the
narrowing of the exemption indicates intent for the law to be consistent
with Title VII’s limited scope, or alternatively, that the bill’s long history with a broad exemption more clearly reflects congressional intent
to treat LGBT differently in some way. One writer convincingly argues
that ENDA’s stand-alone statutory scheme in itself invites courts to
treat LGBT protections differently from other Title VII protections.174
At the same time, as religious organizations are becoming significant
economic players and an increasing number of persons come out of
the closet, the number of affected persons from an exemption is likely
higher than previous estimates. Overlooking this community is detrimental to ENDA potency, and one that deserves more attention from
LGBT advocates.
ENDA’s legislative history suggests that its religious exemption
scope is closely aligned to the politics of the day. Though politics inevi174

See J. Banning Jasiunas, supra note 159.
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tably affect all civil rights proposals,175 the way in which conservative
Christian political forces dictated ENDA’s religious exemption is disquieting. Two observations from this history reinforce this point: (1)
religious organizations enjoyed a wholesale exemption for much of
ENDA’s legislative life, and (2) discussion surrounding the exemption
was often touted as a positive aspect of the bill, even by LGBT advocates. Such a willing concession by lawmakers and lesbian and gay
advocates demonstrates the political climate in which ENDA operated
until recently.
Conservative Christians have long dominated the political and cultural landscape over LGBT rights. Coined as “special rights,” conservative Christian rhetoric was adopted by mainstream America, where the
right from discrimination and harm was seen as inappropriately interest driven.176 Similarly, conservative Christian political forces framed
gay advocacy as an “agenda” that sought to impose a certain set of values on others.177 The Religious Right’s success in dominating the landscape forced LGBT advocates to apologetically defend and qualify its
proposals, as evidenced through enthusiastic claims that ENDA does
not affect religious organizations. As LGBT political capital increases,
however, LGBT advocates have re-fashioned their rhetoric to argue that
LGBT persons deserve workplace protection as a constitutional right.178
The politics of accommodation are familiar to both the Religious
Right and LGBT advocates. While the Religious Right has maintained
an exceptionalism entitlement under the guise of religious freedom, the
LGBT movement has wagered significant sacrifices to achieve legislative success.179 The narrowing of ENDA’s religious exemption, therefore, represents a legislative victory for LGBT civil rights, in which
See generally Charles and Barbara Whalen, The Longest Debate: A Legislative History
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (1985) (documenting the complex political maneuvering involved
in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
176
See Samuel A. Marcosson, The “Special Rights” Canard in the Debate over Lesbian and Gay
Rights, 9 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 137 (1995).
177
See Aimee D. Dayhoff, Sodomy Laws: The Government’s Vehicle to Impose the Majority’s
Social Values, 27 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1863 (2001). See also President Obama and Washington
D.C. radicals plan to impose homosexuality and silence Christianity in workplaces. Will you help
me warn Congress, Family Research Council (Nov. 2009), available at http://thinkprogress.org/
wp-content/uploads/2009/12/FRC-ENDA-letter.pdf. More recently L.G.B.T advocates have reversed the rhetoric to claim that the Religious Right threatens to impose their “religious values”
on others; Many Americans Uneasy with the Mix of Religion and Politics, Pew Research
Center for the People & The Press Aug. 24, (2006), available at http://pewforum.org/uploadedfiles/Topics/Issues/Politics_and_Elections/religion-politics-06.pdf (reporting that 49% of survey participants believe that conservatives are “too assertive” about their values and political
positions).
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conservative Christian entitlement no longer goes unquestioned and
unchallenged. This victory signals to other civil rights advocates that,
although religion continues to play an important role in shaping the
cultural and political landscapes in which policymaking is one part, a
particular religious political force does not necessarily have the power
to single-handedly dictate political outcomes.
ENDA was anticipated to pass during the 111th Congress but as
other pressing political issues, including the ban on open military
service,180 rise on the legislative priority list, ENDA’s once near-clear
path to passage was blocked. Regardless of whether ENDA is passed
this year or in future years, its narrow religious exemption must remain
intact. Lawmakers or LGBT advocates must believe in their political
strength to challenge conservative Christian opposition and avoid easy
concessions around the exemption like in years past. A narrow religious exemption strikes the proper balance between religious freedom
and civil rights progress and manifests fair governmental treatment of
legitimate rivaling interests within a diverse democracy.

V. Conclusion
This essay traced ENDA’s long religious exemption history to
explain how its previous iterations threatened to undermine the bill by
creating a wholesale exemption for religious organizations. It explained
how the exemption’s broadness mirrored changing attitudes about
LGBT people and speculated that broader versions were most likely
political compromises designed to placate the conservative Christian
bloc. This placation, however, overreached to tip the delicate balance
between religious freedom and religious over accommodation; thus,
it most likely violated the Establishment Clause. ENDA’s current religious exemption is integrated within a narrow Title VII version, signifying a major victory for LGBT advocates. The LGBT movement and
other civil rights advocates have successfully challenged the conservative movement’s entitlement to accommodation and averted religious
exceptionalism that put future civil rights struggles at risk. Civil rights
advocates must continue to challenge the Religious Right political paradigm if they truly wish to achieve justice and equality.

See Bronwen Pardes, House repeals “don’t ask, don’t tell,” Wash. Examiner, May 29, 2010 available at http://www.examiner.com/x-49838-NY-Sexual-Health-Examiner~y2010m5d29-Houserepeals-dont-ask-dont-tell.
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